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On the importance of neighbors 
? Neighbor selection is a key building block 
for many applications – e.g., selecting
? inter ISP peering relationships as in BGP
? intra ISP router topology
? neighbors in proxy caching networks
? neighbors in P2P applications as in Bittorrent
? Performance depends largely on the 
quality of one’s neighborhood.
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Love thy neighbor as thyself…
… unless you can 
afford to move!
? In cyberspace, changing 
one’s neighborhood is 
cheap – just rewire!
? Especially true for 
overlay networks. 
? Implications?
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Overlay networks
? Communication 
between any two 
nodes is possible; 
any node is a 
candidate as a 
neighbor
? Cost of overlay link 
could be arbitrary;  
e.g., delay, 
physical hops, 
distance, …
Overlay
Plane
Physical 
Plane
O1
O2
O3
R4
R2
R7
R5 R6
R3R1
November 12, 2008 Selfish Neighbor Selection @ Eurecom 5
Example uses of overlays as …
? Routing Networks (e.g., Skype): 
? Send unicast traffic from one overlay node to another
? Node’s objective is to minimize its average (or maximum) 
routing cost to all destinations
? Broadcast Networks (e.g., MS update):
? Send data from one node to all nodes in the overlay
? Node’s objective is to minimize its average (or maximum) 
broadcast cost to all destinations
? Query Networks (e.g., Gnutella):
? Find content available in some (unknown) overlay node 
? Node’s objective is to query the most number of overlay 
nodes using scoped flooding
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Choosing thy neighborhood game
? Given an established overlay network
? A node evaluates the advantage (if any) 
from picking a different set of neighbors
? If rewiring is warranted, the node changes 
its (outbound) neighbors accordingly
? This rewiring may trigger more rewiring by 
other nodes
and the “Selfish Neighbor Selection” (SNS) 
game goes on…
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How we depart from prior work?
? Selfish routing†
? Game input: Fixed network topology
? Game outcome: Selfishly constructed 
source-based routes over the topology
? Our SNS work:
? Game input: Shortest-path routing
? Game outcome: Selfishly constructed 
network topology 
† References:  [Roughgarden & Tardos, JACM’02] [Qiu et al, Sigcomm’03]
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SNS Game: Interesting questions
? What is the optimal strategy for playing the 
SNS game?
? How does it compare to empirical ones 
(e.g., random, nearest neighbor, …)?
? Under what conditions will neighborhoods 
stabilize (i.e., reach Nash-like equilibrium)? 
? What do the resulting Nash-equilibrium 
overlay structures look like? 
? What is the impact of partial/incomplete 
knowledge on optimal strategies?
? What is the price of anarchy?
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SNS Game: Interesting questions
? What is the effect of node churn on stability 
and performance? 
? What is the effect of changing costs due to 
changes in physical network? 
? What if some (most) nodes are naïve? 
malicious? adversarial? 
? How does this all scale with the size of the 
network?
? Could answers to the above questions 
inform systems/protocol design?
? …
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Formulation of SNS for routing
? Notation:
? S-i is the residual wiring graph defined by the 
local wirings of all nodes except node vi
? S is the global wiring graph obtained by 
adding vi’s choice of neighbors si to S-i
iv SiS−
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Defining an overlay neighborhood
? Assumptions by prior works
? No cap on number of neighbors
? Impractical – think about implications on scoped 
flooding in P2P, link state for routing, OS socket 
overheads, up-link bandwidth fragmentation, …
? Neighbor relationships are symmetric
? Presumptuous – communication is directed and 
costs are often asymmetric
? Our assumptions:
? Nodes have a small bounded-degree k << n
? Neighboring relationship is directed
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Selfish Neighbor Selection (SNS)
? Players:
The set of overlay nodes, V={v1,…,vn}
? Strategies:
A strategy si∈Si for vi amounts to selecting ki
outgoing overlay links; |Si|=(n-1 choose ki)
? Outcome:
S={s1,…,sn} is the “global wiring” composed of 
all “individual wirings” si
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Formulation of SNS for routing
? The objective of node vi is to find the 
local wiring si that minimizes
where
? pij is the preference of vi for vj as destination
? dS (vi,vj) is the cost of routing from vi to vj in S
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How we depart from prior work?
? Prior work assume undirected links, unbounded 
degree, and uniform destination preferences 
? In [Fabrikant et al, PODC’03], a node may “buy” as many 
undirected links as it wants, each at cost α, so as to minimize 
the purchase + access cost
? In [Chun et al, Infocom’04], effect of non-uniform link costs αij is 
empirically evaluated.
? Appropriate for telecom networks, but not 
overlays; results in preferential attachment…
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Neighbor selection strategies
? Best-Response (BR) is the optimal local 
neighbor selection strategy for node vi:
? BR leverages knowledge of topology and link 
costs of residual graph S-i to minimize Ci (S)
? Empirical local strategies that do not use 
global information: 
? k-kandom does not use any link information
? k-closest uses only local information
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BR for SNS (for routing) is NP hard
? Theorem: 
Under uniform overlay 
link weights (e.g., hop-
count), finding the BR 
to S-i is equivalent to 
solving the asymmetric 
k-median on S-i with 
reversed distance cost 
u
w
Since these
cost the same
neighbors w,u
can be found by 
solving 2-median
on S-i with reversed
distances
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BR for SNS (for routing) is NP hard
? Theorem: 
Under uniform overlay link weights (e.g., hop-count), 
finding the BR to S-i is equivalent to solving the 
asymmetric k-median on S-i with reversed distance cost 
? Corollaries:
? BR is NP hard; constant approximation for metric k-
median does not apply
? O(1)-approximation with O(log n) blow-up in number 
of medians [Lin and Vitter, ’92] is possible
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Game theoretic results for SNS†
? Theorem:
All games with uniform node preference, node degree, 
and link costs have pure Nash equilibria (stable graph).
? In any such stable graphs, the cost of any node is at 
most 2 + k -1 + O(1) that of any other node.
? The diameter of the stable graph for a uniform game 
is O(sqrt(n logkn)).
? Theorem:
There exist non-uniform games with no pure Nash 
equilibria.
† Proofs, constructions, and more results in Laoutaris, Rajaraman, Sundaram, Teng, “A 
bounded-degree network formation game”, from arXiv-CoRR cs.GT/0701071.
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Empirical evaluation of SNS (routing)
? Obtain BR wiring for SNS game as follows
start with an arbitrary wiring ;
until wiring is stable or within threshold {
for each node vi {
BR(vi)? heuristically† solve asymmetric k-median;
}}
? Vary problem inputs/parameters and evaluate 
resulting wirings w.r.t. topological features, 
individual node cost, and overall social cost
† Two heuristic implementations: 
- ILP using Simplex method (Cplex Tomlab toolbox)
- Local search (with r-link swap, r = 1, 2, …, k; O(nr) complexity)
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Results under complete uniformity
? Under unit link costs and uniform routing 
preference to all destinations, we know 
that a Nash-equilibrium exists.
? What are the characteristics of the 
resulting wiring graphs?  
? Are they random?
? Do they exhibit a uniform in-degree 
distribution?
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Results under complete uniformity
k = 2 k = 3 k = 5 k = 8
? Not uniform, but skewed in-degree distribution
? Selfishness yields preferential attachment to 
“accidentally” popular nodes
? Phenomenon more evident for small k/n – why?
n = 15
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Effect of skewed routing preference 
? Preferential attachment to “inherently” popular 
nodes satisfies selfishness’ need for popular 
nodes for small k
? What happens with larger k ?
High SkewNo Skew
n = 15, k = 2
November 12, 2008 Selfish Neighbor Selection @ Eurecom 23
The two sources of in-degree skew 
k
Skew
Why is node 13 popular?
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Effect of heterogeneous link costs
?Link cost generation
1. Synthetically using BRITE: 
? Barabasi-Albert (BA) model with heavy-tailed 2D placement
? Euclidean distance used to derive cost of overlay links
2. Empirically from PlanetLab:
? 300-node PlanetLab topology
? All-pair ping traces used to derive cost of overlay links
3. Empirically from AS-level maps
? 12/2001 Rocket-Fuel data of the Internet topology
? AS-level hop-count used to derive cost of overlay links
?Control parameter
? Bound on out-degree (k) ≈ link density (β) 
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Experimental setting
? Neighbor selection strategy
a. The k-random heuristic
b. The k-closest heuristic, a.k.a. greedy
c. SNS Best Response (BR) wiring using ILP
? Experiments done in nine permutations
? Three strategies for a new comer, each assuming residual 
graph was wired using one of the three strategies
? Performance metrics
? Individual Cost = Average cost for a newcomer
? Cost ratio for strategy x = C(x)/C(BR)
? Social Cost = Sum of cost for all nodes
? Social Cost ratio for strategy x = SC(x)/SC(BR)
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If your neighbors are naïve, it pays to be selfish
SNS over random residual networks
? BR is dominant, with k-closest decidedly better than k-
random. BR’s benefit pronounced for small k – why?
Link density Link densityLink density
BRITE (n=50) PlanetLab (n=50) AS-Level (n=50)
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SNS over greedy residual networks
? BR is dominant, with k-random slightly better than k-
closest – why?
Link density Link densityLink density
BRITE (n=50) PlanetLab (n=50) AS-Level (n=50)
If your neighbors are greedy, it pays to be selfish
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SNS over selfish residual networks
? BR is dominant, but not by a significant margin, with k-
closest being quite competitive – why?
Link density Link densityLink density
BRITE (n=50) PlanetLab (n=50) AS-Level (n=50)
If your neighbors are selfish, it’s OK to be naïve
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Social cost benefit from SNS 
? Adopting BR as a neighbor selection strategy results in a 
significant reduction in the social cost (by 30-60%) over 
naïve (random/greedy) approaches.
The network is better off with selfish nodes!  
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Almost Utopia!
? Not much difference between social cost of SNS wiring 
and that of a Utopian wiring over wide ranges of 
preference skew and link density.
The network is almost a utopia with selfish nodes!  
n = 15 n = 50
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EGOIST: SNS prototype
EGOIST Demo at: http://csr.bu.edu/sns
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EGOIST: Implementation
Protocol for EGOIST overlay node vi
1. Bootstraps by connecting to arbitrary neighbors
2. Joins link-state protocol to get residual graph
3. Measures cost to candidate neighbors
4. Wires according to chosen strategy (default: BR)
5. Monitors and announces overlay links
† We have also implemented a light-weight version of this protocol, in 
which steps 2, 4, and 5 are implemented on a central server. 
November 12, 2008 Selfish Neighbor Selection @ Eurecom 33
EGOIST: Features
? Supported metrics:
? Delay (actively/passively monitored with ping/Pyxida)
? Available bandwidth (monitored with pathChirp)
? Node load (monitored with loadavg)
? Supported wiring strategies:
? k-random
? k-closest
? k-regular
? Best-Response (Delay and AvailBw formulations)
? Hybrid Best-Response (subset of links donated to the network)
? BR Computation:
? By using the full residual graph
? By sampling the residual graph
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EGOIST: Baseline results (n=50)
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EGOIST: Active vs. passive
? Passive approaches deliver comparable results 
(across strategies) with much less overhead!
? Greedy indistinguishable from random; regular 
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EGOIST: Other metrics
? Significant gains possible with BR
? Greedy’s performance is lagging – why?
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EGOIST: Re-wiring frequency
? Overlay fairly stable, especially for small k
? Re-wirings increase quite rapidly with k – why?
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EGOIST: Marginal utility of re-wiring
? Most of the benefit achieved with k ~ 3-4
? Re-wirings could be reduced using “lazy” BR
BR Lazy BR (threshold = 10%)
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EGOIST: Effect of churn
? HybridBR delivers much of the efficiency of BR
? Greedy strategy less susceptible to churn than 
random and regular strategies
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EGOIST: Effect of churn
? BR dominates non-BR wirings strategies
? At very high churn, using HybridBR pays off 
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EGOIST: Vulnerability to abuse
? Free riders avoid being chosen as neighbors by 
inflating cost of their outgoing links (*2 above)
? EGOIST is robust to abuse by free riders (not 
the case with greedy neighbor selection)
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EGOIST: Effect of partial knowledge
? Sampling rate affects BR and greedy strategies
? Topology-based biased random sampling 
significantly improves BR’s performance 
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Other SNS objectives
? Routing Networks (e.g., Skype): 
? Send unicast traffic from one overlay node to another
? Node’s objective is to minimize its average (or maximum) 
routing cost to all destinations
? Broadcast Networks (e.g., MS updates):
? Send data from one node to all nodes in the overlay
? Node’s objective is to minimize its average (or maximum) 
broadcast cost to all destinations
? Query Networks (e.g., Gnutella):
? Find content available in some (unknown) overlay node 
? Node’s objective is to query the most number of overlay 
nodes using scoped flooding
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The n-way broadcast problem
? Each node needs to send a file to all others
? Exchange of large scientific data-sets in grid computing
? Distribution of traffic log files for network-wide IDS
? Synchronization of distributed databases
? Distributed backup
? Use swarming to reduce link stress
? How do we create the underlying torrent topology?
? Could SNS lead to better overlay on which to swarm?
? What would constitute a selfish objective?
? Maximize the average bandwidth over all nodes 
? Maximize the minimum bandwidth across all nodes
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Swarming over SNS overlays
File ID
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Thou shalt swarm over selfishly-constructed overlays!  
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Query routing over SNS overlays
Thou shalt query over selfishly-constructed overlays!  
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Take home messages
? Performance of overlays depends highly 
on neighbor selection strategy
? Framing neighbor selection as a strategic 
game yields highly optimized overlays
? Implementing SNS is practical and yields 
overlays that are robust to churn/abuse
? Papers, demos, traces, and code 
available from http://csr.bu.edu/sns
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